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Nelson Goodman and Project Zero: 




In 1967, Nelson Goodman founded Project Zero, a program of basic research 
into art education, which, even today, is an international reference point. This 
article reviews the relationships between the theses set out in Languages of 
art and the most original results obtained by Project Zero between 1967 and 
1971, when Goodman was the director. Thus emerges the role of general 
symbol theory in developing an educational approach that attempts to over-
come the dichotomy between art and science, between the emotive and the 
cognitive. The article also analyzes the effects of Goodman’s participation in 
Project Zero on his aesthetic-philosophical reflections, using it to interpret 
both the exemplar function taken on by art in Ways of worldmaking, and the 
emergence of new concepts such as that of “implementation”. 
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1. A basic investigation into art education 
 
In 1967, several months before publishing Languages of art2, Nelson 
Goodman founded “Project Zero”, a program of basic research into 
education for the arts, at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. 
The founding team was made up of Goodman himself, who served as 
the director for four years, and two young research assistants who 
would later become famous for their work in the field of education: 
Howard Gardner and David Perkins, then graduate students at Har-
                                                             
1 annamaria.contini@unimore.it. 
2 We remind the reader that the theses presented in Languages of art had al-
ready been written by the author in the early 1960s; as we will see, the theory of 
symbols set out in this book is the theoretical basis of Project Zero.  
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vard and MIT, respectively3. Scholars from a variety of fields also 
worked on the project, with various roles: musicologist Jeanne Bam-
berger, educator Frank Dent, philosopher of education Vernon How-
ard, psychologists John Kennedy and Paul Kolers, literary analyst Bar-
bara Leondar, and many more. Certain members of the Harvard fac-
ulty, such as Jerome Bruner and Israel Scheffler, also provided sup-
port and contributions. It was thus a decidedly multidisciplinary team; 
moreover, under Goodman’s leadership, Project Zero focused on the 
nature of artistic knowledge and the advancement of the arts 
through the improvement of education in terms of both under-
standing and production.  
The choice of the name “Project Zero” reflected the founder’s be-
lief that, in comparison to education in other fields, education in the 
arts was sparse, sporadic, and chaotic. Although there were many 
good teachers, there was no systematic and communicable know-
ledge about arts education:  
 
We began near zero (hence our name) with little more than a conviction of 
the importance of the task and some tentative notions as to where to direct 
our attention first. Bits of evidence, conjectures, apparently remote studies, 
perplexing questions, have come gradually to relate to and illuminate each 
other. These have suggested news hypotheses and lines of thought that have 
in turn brought to bear the results of other, often apparently remote, stud-
ies. (Goodman et al. 1972: 1, Goodman 1984: 151) 
 
Goodman’s interest in the world of art had deep roots. During his 
undergraduate years at Harvard College, he began studies in the 
practical and theoretical aspects of art with Paul Sachs, the Associate 
Director of the Fogg Art Museum at that time. From 1928 (that is to 
say, immediately after his graduation) to 1941, Goodman was Direc-
tor of the Walker-Goodman Art Gallery in Copley Square, Boston. 
There, he met his future wife, Katharine Sturgis, who was a fairly well-
known visual artist. In these same years, he began to collect art ob-
jects, a passion that continued throughout his life; his private art col-
lection became so vast as to include works from various historical and 
geographical sources: seventeenth century old master paintings, 
                                                             
3 Gardner, after a PhD in Development Psychology (1971), developed his theory 
of multiple intelligences; Perkins, after earning a PhD in Mathematics and Artifi-
cial Intelligence (1970), wrote highly influential texts on the nature of creativity. 
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modern art from Picasso to Demuth, ancient Asian sculptures, Native 
American arts, etc. (see Carter 2000). Also starting in 1928, Goodman 
began his PhD under the supervision of C.I. Lewis, the founder of a 
conceptual pragmatism that combined influences from logical positiv-
ism with the pragmatism of Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. 
Goodman finished his PhD in 1941 with the thesis A study of qualities, 
in which he – in partial continuity with Carnap ([1928] 1961) – devel-
oped an original form of nominalism. The delay in obtaining his PhD 
was caused by the extensive effort he put into managing the Art Gal-
lery and other related activities. In fact, for many years, Goodman 
would constantly be travelling between the art world and the world 
of logic and epistemology. After military service during World War II, 
he chose the academic life and taught at the University of Pennsylva-
nia and Brandeis University before returning to Harvard in 1968 (see 
Cohnitz, Rossberg 2006: 1-27). However, 1968 was also the year in 
which Goodman published Languages of art, the book that recon-
nected his interest in the arts with his inquiries into the theory of 
knowledge: “All my life has been lived in the arts and in philosophy, 
but it was only very late in 1968, that I ever wrote anything combin-
ing the two. I had become increasingly aware that the revelation we 
get from science (I am talking about theoretical science) and the 
revelation we get from art are very much alike” (Goodman 1984: 
192). 
Howard Gardner (2000) has observed that Project Zero would 
never have been born if it had not been for the concatenation of 
three factors. He suggests that the first of these was the publication 
of Languages of art, in which the study of different symbol systems 
become the basis for a reflection on art whose value increases as it 
opens itself to contributions from other disciplines. A second factor 
was drawn from the atmosphere in education in the 1960s. After the 
blow that was the launching of Sputnik (the first artificial satellite in 
history) by the Soviets in 1967, the United States had begun to re-
form the education system in order to emphasize the teaching of 
mathematical and scientific subjects at the expense of the arts and 
humanities. By the mid-1960s, awareness of the necessity of correct-
ing this asymmetry at least somewhat had grown, and both public 
and private institutes were willing to finance investigations into art 
education. Gardner also cites more particular circumstances: Theodor 
Sizer, the Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, had re-
ceived funds to foster research and pedagogy in the arts and, perhaps 
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on the recommendation of Israel Scheffler, invited Goodman, who 
was already considering leaving Brandeis University, to head the pro-
gram. “Equipped with a little budget and a lot of lively ideas, Good-
man launched an unprecedented research project that has lasted, in-
deed prospered, until today” (Gardner 2000: 246). 
However, despite Goodman’s wide-ranging bibliography, there 
are few works whose aim was to better understand the significance 
of his participation in Project Zero. In the following pages, we will, 
first of all, try to reconstruct the theoretical connection between 
Languages of art and Project Zero; we will ask ourselves what this 
program’s principal contributions were to the analysis of both theo-
retical and methodological problems of art education during the 
years when Goodman was its director; finally, we will consider what 




2. From Languages of art to Project Zero 
 
In the introduction of Languages of art, Goodman warns the reader 
not to be misled by the book’s title: problems concerning the arts – 
he writes – are a “point of departure rather than of convergence. The 
objective is an approach to a general theory of symbols”. Goodman 
specifies that the word symbol will be used “as a very general and 
colorless term” that can be applied to “words, texts, pictures, dia-
grams, maps, models, and more” (Goodman 1968: XI). A symbol is 
anything that stands for something; as a result, the investigation will 
touch upon questions concerning not only art, but also the sciences, 
technology, perception, and practice.  
However, this does not mean that the question of art is of little 
relevance. Rather, as is demonstrated clearly throughout the volume, 
Goodman’s objective is to free art from the ghetto of its presumed 
autonomy: instead of isolating elements or characteristics that would 
define art, he intends to study it in the context of a systematic inquiry 
into the varieties and functions of symbols that includes both verbal 
and non-verbal symbol systems, “from pictorial representation on the 
one hand to musical intonation on the other”. Better understanding 
of the field of art requires a comparison with other fields; only within 
a general theory of symbols is it possible to reassert the cognitive 
value of art, without reducing it to an emotive fact. Reciprocally, only 
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a non “insular” concept of art can dissolve the dichotomy between 
the cognitive and the emotive that makes it impossible to seize “the 
modes and means of reference and their varied and pervasive use in 
the operations of the understanding” comprehensively enough 
(Goodman 1968: XI).  
Consistently with this project, in Languages of art, Goodman put 
into action a double strategy. On one side, he developed a topogra-
phy of the many forms of referential practices: denotation and exem-
plification (samples and labels), description and representation (ver-
bal and non-verbal symbols), possession and expression (literal and 
metaphorical) are all differentiated, but as various articulations or, as 
he would later say, “routes of reference” (Goodman 1984: 55). For 
example, painted representation can be considered a special case of 
denotation: in order to represent an object, a painting must not re-
semble it, but rather be a symbol of it, that is, mean it, refer to it. On 
the other hand, the distinction between denotation and exemplifica-
tion is related to the orientation of the reference: while denotation 
moves from the symbol towards the thing (like the word “red”, which 
denotes the color red), exemplification moves from the thing towards 
the symbol (as in the case of a tailor’s fabric sample, which exempli-
fies a few properties of the fabric in question: color, texture, weave, 
pattern). On the other hand, Goodman develops a type of symbol 
system based on the five requirements of the notational systems: un-
ambiguity, syntactic and semantic disjointedness, and differentiation. 
The result is a classification that makes it possible to compare the var-
ious symbolization systems used in art, science, and life in general: 
from clocks to counters, from diagrams to maps models, from musi-
cal scores to painters’ sketches and scripts (intended in a broad sense 
as the characters of natural languages). A linguistic system, whether 
notational or not, satisfies at least the syntactic requirements of dis-
jointedness and differentiation; representation is distinguished from 
description not because it is “iconic” (that is, more similar to what it 
denotes and therefore less arbitrary), but rather because of the ab-
sence of syntactic articulation and the resulting density of the symbol 
scheme. Signs do not have “intrinsic” properties, but a thing serves as 
a sign only in relation to a symbol system.  
In the last chapter of Languages of art, entitled Art and under-
standing, the overall articulation now taken up by general symbol 
theories leads us to rethink the aesthetic experience, recognizing that 
for it, it is necessary to “make delicate discriminations and discern 
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subtle relationships”: all artistic forms (painting, sculpture, music, po-
etry, dance, architecture, etc.) constitute a symbol system, each with 
its own peculiarities, and yet, they can be associated with other artis-
tic forms and types of symbolic systems. Additionally, the aesthetic 
attitude cannot be reduced to passive contemplation without contex-
tualization: “The aesthetic ‘attitude’ is restless, searching, testing – is 
less attitude than action: creation and re-creation” (Goodman 1968: 
241-2). Like science, art is a way of understanding the world, that is, 
of operating with symbol systems to build a certain “vision” of the 
world. In fact, the relationship between symbols and facts or empiri-
cal data is never objective and unequivocal: it is this way neither in 
art, where innumerable ways of representing or describing the same 
object exist, nor in science, whose symbol systems contribute to mak-
ing up the objects that we propose to know. At this point, the prob-
lem is to understand what distinguishes aesthetic activity from other 
intelligent behaviors, especially scientific research.  
In order to try to answer this question, Goodman reviews several 
distinctive traits usually attributed to art and the aesthetic experi-
ence: the absence of a practical end, the presence of pleasure or sat-
isfaction, the prevalence of a sentimental and emotional dimension. 
In his opinion, none of these traits are adequately justified; not even 
the role played by emotion seems clear, because the dichotomy be-
tween cognitive and emotive prevents us from “seeing that in the 
aesthetic experience, the emotions function cognitively”, represent-
ing a tool to discern what properties a work possesses and expresses. 
Sustaining this, warns Goodman, does not mean falling back into an 
abstract intellectualism: emotions must be felt in order to take part in 
cognition. Their cognitive use, if anything “involves discriminating and 
relating them in order to gauge and grasp the work and integrate it 
with the rest of our experience and the world” (Goodman 1968: 248). 
In the aesthetic experience, emotions are not erased, but rather al-
tered. Furthermore, emotions function cognitively “not as separate 
items but in combination with one another and with other means of 
knowing” (Goodman 1968: 249) such as perception and conceptual-
ization. 
However, even after having clarified the role of emotion, we do 
not have a criterion to distinguish the aesthetic experience from all 
the others. Instead of insisting upon searching for this criterion, 
Goodman formulates his famous theory of the “symptoms of the aes-
thetic”, with which, abandoning the pretense of defining once and for 
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all what an aesthetic fact is, he searches for its recurring aspects, the 
characteristics that “tend to be present rather than absent, and to be 
prominent in aesthetic experience” (Goodman 1968: 254), even if 
they are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. In fact, the task 
of these symptoms – syntactic density, semantic density, syntactic 
repleteness, exemplification – is not so much to clearly demarcate 
the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic, but rather to enable a better 
comprehension of the aesthetic functioning of signs (see Marchetti 
2006: 93). In this way, we could avoid mistaking density for ineffabil-
ity with its unsatisfied need for absolute precision, and for immediate 
exemplification with its characteristic of correlating a symbol to a ref-
erence by designating a property that is possessed. As revealed by 
the irrelevance conferred to the question of aesthetic value and the 
related possibility of determining what is beautiful and what is ugly, 
the essential objective is to reaffirm the cognitive goal of symboliza-
tion: the aesthetic experience is a form of comprehension, and, as 
such, its excellence depends on its cognitive efficacy. Again, this does 
not mean excluding the emotive aspect: “what we know through art 
is felt in our bones and nerves and muscles as well as grasped by our 
minds, that all the sensitivity and responsiveness of the organism par-
ticipates in the invention and interpretation of symbols” (Goodman 
1968: 259). It is, rather, to eliminate the gap between the scientific 
and the aesthetic, showing that truth is not a prerogative of science, 
an objective that opposes science to art; in both fields, truth is, albeit 
in different ways, a matter of fit – of a theory to facts and of facts to 
the theory: “Truth and its aesthetic counterpart amount to appropri-
ateness under different names” (Goodman 1968: 264).  
In conclusion, there is a deep unity between art and science, 
which diverge significantly only through the predominance of certain 
characteristics specific to their respective symbols. On the last page 
of Languages of art, Goodman acknowledges the possible fallout of 
this conceptual framework in the areas of psychology and pedagogy: 
 
Once the arts and sciences are seen to involve working with – inventing, ap-
plying, reading, transforming, manipulating – symbol systems that agree and 
differ in certain specific ways, we can perhaps undertake pointed psychologi-
cal investigation of how the pertinent skills inhibit or enhance one another, 
and the outcome might well call for changes in educational technology. Our 
preliminary study suggests, for example, that some processes requisite for a 
science are less akin to each other than to some requisite for an art. But let 
us forego foregone conclusions. Firm and usable results are as far off as bad-
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ly needed; and the time has come in this field for the false truism and the 
plangent platitude to give way to the elementary experiment and the hesi-
tant hypothesis. (Goodman 1968: 265) 
 
Languages of art thus ends by building a bridge towards a new in-
vestigational objective. The “epistemic turn” in aesthetics does not 
remain a mere theoretical instance, but rather finds a field of applica-




3. Project Zero’s aims and results during “Goodman’s era” 
 
In 1972, Goodman, together with Howard Gardner and David Perkins, 
oversaw a Final Report for the United States Office of Education, 
which had financed the first years of Project Zero. Entitled Basic abili-
ties required for understanding and creation in the arts4, this report il-
lustrates the theoretical paradigm upon which Project Zero is based, 
examining the experimental investigations and conceptual studies 
carried out, and outlines a balance of the results achieved to that 
point.  
The Final Report begins by declaring the aims of the Project: the 
“advancement of the arts through improved education of artists, au-
diences, and management”. It is immediately clear that art education 
is meant in the broad sense, both because it is not limited to what is 
taught in schools, and because it includes the processes and human 
abilities implicated both in the production and comprehension of the 
arts. Goodman and his collaborators warn that they are not looking 
for “mathematical formulas for nurturing abilities in the arts”, but ra-
ther “various possible ways that education may be made more useful 
– or at least less damaging – to such abilities” (Goodman et al. 1972: 
1, Goodman 1984: 150-1). This clarification is necessary, because it 
                                                             
4 Despite its great interest, this 100-page Final Report has remained unpublished, 
even if scholars interested in reading it could have asked for a hard copy from 
Harvard Project Zero, as today they can download it online; only several para-
graphs of the first and seventh chapter – probably those written by Goodman 
alone – were published in Of mind and other matters (Goodman 1984: 150-67). 
When possible, we will refer to both texts; references only to the Final Report 
mean that the passage belongs to a yet unpublished section.  
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defuses the conviction that this type of research would destroy art in 
the end, as any analysis or educational investigation, or even educa-
tion itself would be antithesis of art. The Report therefore preemp-
tively discusses the “collection of popular prejudices and philosophi-
cal fallacies concerning the arts, education, and even research meth-
odology” (Goodman et al. 1972: 4, Goodman 1984: 153), also consid-
ering oppositions and obstacles to any attempt to impose rigorous 
terms to the question.  
The most frequent misconception is that of seeing art as an area 
of experiences, emotions, and immediate values, and seeing science, 
by contrast, as an area of inferences, cognition, and facts. This derives 
from the epistemological dichotomy, now considered as antiquated 
as it is unsustainable: “data” or the immediate versus that which is 
the fruit of inference, or mediate; the emotive versus the cognitive. 
“The conclusion is drawn either that the arts are unteachable or that 
methods for teaching immediate awareness, feeling, and appre-
ciation must be sought”. Challenging such a conclusion, Goodman 
and his collaborators invite us to consider how it would be advanta-
geous for any research on the topic to recognize that “the distinction 
between mediate and immediate experience may be illusory, that the 
emotions rather than being antithetical to cognition may be instru-
ments of it, and that appreciation may be as subsidiary to under-
standing in the arts as in the sciences” (Goodman et al. 1972: 4-5, 
Goodman 1984: 153). On the other hand, a serious study of educa-
tion in the arts is also led astray by two opinions that are opposites of 
each other, but equally damaging: one according to which the arts 
would merely be “instruments of entertainment”, and another ac-
cording to which the arts would be belong to a “plane far above most 
human activities, accessible only to an élite”. A further misunder-
standing is created by confusing the problem of artistic education 
with the problem of creativity: “Ways of discovering and fostering 
originality, superior talent, and genius are surely wanted for the arts; 
but no more so than for the technologies and sciences”. The authors 
of the Report also criticize the romantic identification of art with the 
genius of an inspiration that blooms unexpectedly in the mind of an 
artist, and, requires neither techniques nor methodologies in order to 
become concrete. They, in fact, sustain that “realization, whether in 
physics or painting, in medicine or music, is normally an arduous pro-
cess, straining skill and pertinacity” (Goodman et al. 1972: 5, Good-
man 1984: 154-5). One can be taught to produce art, although the 
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teaching must be made up of multiple methods: practice, apprentice-
ship, demonstration, collaborative assistance, etc.  
There is, however, also an obstacle that has its roots in a real diffi-
culty: the absence of clear and reliable parameters for evaluating the 
quality of the works produced make it quite problematic to evaluate 
art education programs. However, the search for general and sharea-
ble principles to guide such evaluation must not be abandoned. 
Among them, the choice of judging education programs “less in the 
light of aesthetic standards applied to the ultimate results than in the 
light of what we can discover concerning the functioning of human 
beings, the nature of the processes involved in various phases of the 
production and understanding of works in the several arts, and way 
of fostering abilities to carry out those processes” (Goodman et al. 
1972: 77, Goodman 1984: 164) stands out. In other words, it is nec-
essary to shift attention from the results to the processes, evaluating 
the means with which the various education programs develop the 
abilities and competencies that favor the production and comprehen-
sion of art. 
The reconstruction of the theoretical framework follows, the the-
ory of symbols exposed in Languages of art, which takes on a crucial 
role in many points of view: it makes it possible to overcome the di-
chotomy between art and science, between the emotive and the 
cognitive; it indicates that creation and artistic comprehension are 
not the fruits of pure inspiration or passive contemplation, but that 
they involve active and constructive processes; it offers the basis for 
analyzing similarities and differences between symbol systems, and 
therefore, for comparing, distinguishing, and interrelating tasks of 
many kinds, as well as abilities involved in dealing with these tasks. 
Such a theory acquires relevance even for the purposes of empirical 
research: “By identifying the kinds of symbol systems involved in a 
given phase of a particular artistic activity, we have gained some clues 
as to the skills required as well as to ways of discerning and develop-
ing those skills” (Goodman et al. 1972: 1-2, Goodman 1984: 152). 
The theory of symbols presents undoubted affinities with the cog-
nitively-oriented psychology that was asserting itself in those years, 
and whose solicitations Project Zero accepted (for example, the view 
of the human perceiver as an active, constructive organism) when it 
had not yet penetrated in the area of education, and was seen as 
suspicious in arts education. After all, most research activities synthe-
sized in the Report dealt with psychological-pedagogical questions. At 
Annamaria Contini, Nelson Goodman and Project Zero 
 
 159 
times, theoretical nuclei of Languages of art – such as the difference 
between linguistic and nonlinguistic symbols – were declined in a new 
way, with possible correlations in human neurological functioning.5 
Entire chapters then presented accounts of studies and experiments 
of perceptual functions involved in artistic production and compre-
hension: studies of the perception of pictures, ranging from line 
drawings to caricature and to tactile-perceived pictures; studies of 
the perception of music, with particular attention to the role of 
rhythm as an organizing force in human development and to chil-
dren’s invention and/or learning of rhythm notation; developmental 
investigations of children’s sensitivity to painting, literary and musical 
styles; analysis of the nature of problem-solving in different aesthetic 
media. Regarding arts education more specifically, the Report intro-
duces a taxonomy of methods of education and describes various ini-
tiatives: the site-visits to institutions of art education, the sponsoring 
of lecture-performances, the start of a training program in arts man-
agement, and the launching of a course based on Project Zero.  
In summary, what were the results of the first years of Project Ze-
ro? In what measure did Goodman and his collaborators succeed in 
identifying the basic abilities employed in the creation and under-
standing of arts? Did they fulfill the Project’s aims at least in part, that 
is, the “advancement of the arts through improved education of art-
ists, audiences, and management”?  
Even if the Final Report insists on the non-marginal space given to 
empirical research, it is certain that the main results of Project Zero in 
“Goodman’s era” were theoretical in nature. This does not mean that 
they do not contribute to the definition of the specific abilities re-
quired in art: a project that starts almost at zero must necessarily first 
confront “basic theoretical studies into the nature of art and of edu-
cation and a critical scrutiny of elementary concepts and prevalent 
assumptions and question” (Goodman 1989: 1); furthermore, only 
based on an adequate conceptual corpus is it possible to formulate 
hypotheses “about ways of fostering particular skill or about how im-
provement in a given skill may enhance or inhibit another” (Goodman 
1984: 149). We therefore see what the most relevant theoretical re-
sults are from this point of view.  
                                                             
5 Project Zero has pioneered in the study of cortical representation of different 
artistic symbolic skills (see Gardner, Winner 1981).  
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1) “Production and understanding in the arts involve human activ-
ities that, though they differ in specific ways among themselves and 
from other activities, are nevertheless generically related to percep-
tion, scientific inquiry, and other cognitive activity” (Goodman et al. 
1972: 81). On one hand, research regarding didactics in the arts tends 
to cross over into a more general study of how human beings learn, 
discover, and understand; on the other hand, arts education appears 
“as a requisite and integrated component of the entire educational 
process” (Goodman 1989: 1).  
2) If work in the arts, like much human activity, entails the pro-
cessing of symbols, then arts education can be viewed as “the impart-
ing of literacy skills in the area of artistic symbolization”. In other 
words, “a focus on artistic symbolization makes it possible to demysti-
fy artistic processes” (Gardner 1989: 158-9), redefining the role of 
mystery and inspiration. Education for the arts will consist of “discov-
ering or inculcating and fostering the abilities appropriate to the spe-
cific activities involved” (Goodman et al. 1972: 81). At the same time, 
this approach will avoid leading to confusion and error, like the fre-
quent insistence of many teachers on the contrast between the ver-
bal and the visual. In fact, characterizing the difference between po-
etry and painting, between verbal and non-verbal, in terms of “ver-
bal” and “visual” means ignoring the fact that the verbal is often visu-
al (for example, in reading) and that the non-visual (for example, in 
hearing) is often non-verbal (Goodman et al. 1972: 7, Goodman 1984: 
156).  
3) “Creativity is neither peculiar to the arts nor the sole or com-
prehensive concern of education for the arts” (Goodman et al. 1972: 
81). Exclusive attention to creativity has often obscured the im-
portance of the several skills that creation in art must employ and the 
existence of connections between scientific and artistic activities. 
Vice versa, if we admit that many tasks in the arts, like many in sci-
ence, imply the processing of symbols, we also admit the possibility 
of transferring abilities and competences from one field to the other.  
4) The emphasis placed on the symbolic, cognitive, planning as-
pects of the arts leads us to give value to the role played by problem-
solving, seeing there a model in terms of which the moment-to-
moment artist’s behavior at work can be described. “An analysis of 
behavior as a sequence of problem-solving and planning activities 
seems to be most promising. Such an approach provides a healthy 
counterbalance to the stereotyped image of the artist’s behavior as 
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immediate and unstructured” (Goodman et al. 1972: 49). Maintaining 
that producing a work of art is often a much more deliberative activi-
ty than is generally thought can have important consequences in art 
education. For example, a novice attempting an accurate portrayal of 
the human form can realize that his production is “not right” but not 
know what to do about it. Some ineffective efforts to touch it up with 
eraser and pencil will convince him that there is nothing he can do 
about it; the instructor can implicitly agree with him and consider this 
student’s production as the limit of his abilities. “Thus, what should 
be treated as a problem, something to be solved, is treated by stu-
dent and teacher as an inviolate limitation” (Goodman et al. 1972: 
50). Therefore, albeit with all of the necessary distinctions6, teaching 
problem-solving can be useful in both scientific and artistic education.  
Goodman and his collaborators are convinced that these results, 
together with the experimental investigations cited above, can pro-
mote both arts and education in the arts. Nearly twenty years later, 
Goodman would remark with a certain pride: “In the early years of 
the Project, the very idea of the arts as cognitive and of systematic 
research into arts education met with widespread and virulent hostili-
ty. Nowadays the approach and the whole conception of the Project 
attract wide though scattered interest and respect. […] I like to think 
that the Project itself, by its persistent work with unwelcome ideas, 
may in some slight way have contributed to this change” (Goodman 
1989: 2). 
However, if read carefully, the Final Report reveals a lacuna: the 
lack of concrete didactic experiences in schools. Except for one re-
search study of the learning of musical rhythm carried out by Jeanne 
Bamberger in an elementary school, all of the experiments men-
tioned or described in the Report were carried out with developmen-
tal psychology methods and approaches. In hindsight, however, this 
was by choice: the Project had eschewed “a reductive interpretation 
of education as ‘training’ or ‘schooling’. No one requires an education 
exclusively, or even chiefly, in an instructional setting” (Goodman et 
                                                             
6 In the Final Report, a work by Gardner (1971) is cited, in which two manners of 
problem-solving are described, that often, but not always, reflect differences be-
tween art and science: one type, conceptualization of relevant factor, is more 
prevalent in the sciences; the other, execution confirmed to a specific medium, is 
more prevalent in the arts.  
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al. 1972: 53)7. Furthermore, even when confronting problems of in-
struction in the arts, it gives equal weight to instruction and experi-
ence in a wider sense. From this point of view, it is possible to sustain 
– as does Gardner (1989: 161) – that “from its earliest days, Project 
Zero has been involved in a variety of ways in educational concerns”. 
In the late 1960s, members of the team visited a number of insti-
tutions with active programs in the arts, for the purpose of undertak-
ing a rather detailed survey of ongoing effective arts-education prac-
tices. At the same time, for three years (1969-71), Project Zero orga-
nized an original educational program, whose primary audience was 
made up of the staff and students at the Harvard Graduate School of 
Education who planned to enter secondary school teaching. The pro-
gram, called Art in the making, included a series of lecture-
performances or performance-demonstrations in various artistic are-
as (photography, cinema, poetry, modern dance, theatrical mime, 
music). Professional artists prepared their presentations after con-
sulting the researchers of Project Zero. The aim was to explain the 
means with which an artist creates a work of art, showing not only 
the finished product, but also the aspects of artistic work that are 
rarely visible to the public: “the exploration of alternatives, the meet-
ing of constraints imposed by different media, the constant rework-
ing in search of the right effect” (Goodman et al. 1972: 72, Goodman 
1984: 160). Art in the making was therefore a laboratory for informal 
experimentation in arts education. Another very innovative initiative 
of the time concerned the ideation and realization, in association 
with the Harvard Business School, of a program of Education for Arts 
Management. The third of these instructional efforts was “Project Ze-
ro Course”, a seminar whose objective was to introduce Harvard stu-
dents to research in arts education through involving them in small 
research projects designed by them in cooperation with Project 
members.  
                                                             
7 Goodman (1989: 2) would insist on the need not to lose sight of Project Zero’s 
efforts on behalf of basic theoretical research: “Our primary function is not to se-
lect educational procedures, plan curricula, or design educational programs. […] 
Our task is to provide analyses and information that may help in clarifying objec-
tives and concepts and questions […]. Much remains to be done, but when Pro-
ject Zero turns to writing prescriptions and instruction books, when it becomes 
Project-How-To, it will have passed on to an unjust reward”.  
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In 1972, Howard Gardner and David Perkins assumed co-
directorship of Project Zero, and filled the role until 2000. Under their 
direction, the Project widened its area of investigation, including 
within it a number of other themes besides the arts: for example, 
children’s response to television, the development of different figura-
tive language forms, the nature of intelligence and of higher-order 
thinking skill, etc. In parallel, the number of educational programs, in-
ternational presentations, internal researchers, and external collabo-
rators increased8. Relationships with educational institutions were al-
so reinforced: members of the staff were involved in projects and 
teaching experiments located in the schools, while important Project 
Zero initiatives such as “Spectrum” and “Arts Propel” partnered with 
preschools and high school, respectively9. When a first balance was 
drawn, the co-directors observed: “However, the arts and arts educa-
tion have always remained prominent foci of work at Project Zero. 
[…] We share a belief that the arts, usually celebrated as the domin-
ion of emotions, are profoundly cognitive activities; a belief that hu-
man intelligence is symbolically mediated […]; a belief that creative 
and critical thinking in the arts and the sciences have far more in 
common than is often thought” (Perkins, Gardner 1989: VII-X)10.  
 
 
4. Art in action, art in theory 
 
In 1972, Goodman left the position of director of Project Zero, but 
continued to cultivate the side of “art in action”. He participated in 
the publications edited by members of the Project Zero staff, and 
published various articles about themes related to art education, 
such as A message from Mars and The end of the museum? (included 
                                                             
8 Project Zero is now one of the major international centers of research into edu-
cation and the promotion of learning, thinking, and creativity in the arts and oth-
er disciplines, in children and adults, at individual and institutional levels (see 
http://www.pz.harvard.edu).  
9 We also note the research done by Project Zero in the end of the 1990s in col-
laboration with the Municipal Infant-toddler Centers and Preschools of Reggio 
Emilia (see Giudici et al. 2001).  
10 On this topic, we can see the works of a psychologist, Ellen Winner, who joined 
Project Zero in 1973: these serve as strong examples of the importance that the 
question of art will continue to have in the later phases of the project.  
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in Goodman 1984). At Harvard, Goodman was also involved in establi-
shing the Dance Center and the Institute for Arts Administration: he 
chaired the Arts Orientation Series (1969-1971) and was advisor of 
the Arts for Summer School (1971-1977). Most of all, Goodman ac-
tively participated as a producer in the art world, conceiving several 
multimedia-performance events, including Variations. An illustrated 
lecture concert, featuring twenty-one of Pablo Picasso’s variations on 
Diego Velásquez’s painting Las meninas. “The original painting and its 
variations were displayed with the help of slide projections, while a 
musical theme an analogous twenty-one variations composed by Da-
vid Alpher were played” (Conhitz, Rossberg 2006: 9). In the same pe-
riod, Goodman intensified his philosophical production, publishing 
numerous articles and books Problems and projects (1972), Ways of 
worldmaking (1978), Of mind and other matters (1984) and Recon-
ceptions in philosophy and other arts and sciences (with Elgin, 1988). 
In both, the question of art returned again and again. Now, can we 
retrace in them influences from the research done with Project Zero? 
In what way does the side of “art in action” reflect on that of “art in 
theory”? These questions could set off many paths of inquiry about 
the “last” Goodman; without claiming in any way to deal with the 
topic in an exhaustive manner, we will limit ourselves to several es-
sential nuclei. 
A first element that seems attributable to the presuppositions and 
mission of Project Zero is the increased importance given to art. The 
chapters that make up Ways of worldmaking were written in the sev-
en years prior to the publication of the book, so in the period that in-
cludes or immediately follows Goodman’s participation in Project Ze-
ro, which he mentions when he thanks “my Project Zero associates 
Paul Kolers and Vernon Howard” (Goodman 1978: IX). The volume, 
which immediately generated lively discussion (see Quine 1978, for 
example) radicalized the constructionism of Languages of art, affirm-
ing that there is not one world, but rather many worlds, or rather one 
world for each correct version given, for each appropriate way of 
combining and building symbols. There is not one absolute reality; ra-
ther, a world is real for the version of which it is composed, just as a 
version is correct for the world it constitutes. In this new perspective, 
which “eventuates in something akin to irrealism” (Goodman 1978: 
X), it does not only admit that “the arts must be taken no less serious-
ly than science as modes of discovery, creation, and enlargement of 
knowledge” and that therefore “the philosophy of art should be con-
Annamaria Contini, Nelson Goodman and Project Zero 
 
 165 
ceived as an integral part of metaphysics and epistemology” (Good-
man 1978: 102). The arts assume an even more crucial role, not so 
much in and of themselves as in relation to a gnoseological strategy 
that, giving up the exercise of a foundational mechanism (see Chiodo 
2006: 13-36), speaks of “ways of worldmaking”, “fabrication of facts”, 
“worlds in conflict” and substantial continuity between reality and fic-
tion.  
The arts make world-versions using various means of reference: 
statement, description, representation, exemplification, and expres-
sion. In certain cases, such as that of abstract painting, we might 
think that the ability to represent any world, real or fiction, is lost. But 
this is not true, because it is precisely in these cases that it becomes 
clear how a generally neglected way of reference works, and that is it 
so typical of works of arts as to be an aesthetic symptom: exem-
plification. Works of abstract painting exemplify certain properties 
that can literally or metaphorically serve as samples of shared or 
shareable forms, colors, feelings, such works “induce reorganization 
of our accustomed world in accordance with these features, thus di-
viding and combining erstwhile relevant kinds, adding and subtract-
ing, effecting new discriminations and integrations, reordering priori-
ties” (Goodman 1978: 105). In other words, such works operate as 
symbols, and therefore may activate all of the process that Goodman 
places at the foundation of worldmaking both in art and in science or 
in the perception of daily life. As a result, it is necessary to revise the 
conviction according to which knowing would be exclusively or mainly 
related to the determination of what is true. In fact, while the truth 
pertains solely to what is said, worlds are made also by what is exem-
plified and expressed – by what is shown as well as by what is said: “A 
nonrepresentational picture such as a Mondrian says nothing, de-
notes nothing, pictures nothing, and is neither true or false, but 
shows much” (Goodman 1978: 19). Rather than speak of pictures as 
true or false we might better speak of theories as right or wrong. 
Truth itself cannot be conceived as corresponding with a ready-made 
world: “Rather than attempting to subsume descriptive and repre-
sentational rightness under truth, we shall do better, I think, to sub-
sume truth along with these under the general notion of rightness of 
fit” (Goodman 1978: 132).  
The procedures and criteria adopted in the search for correct 
world-versions go from deductive and inductive inferences to faithful 
exemplification and agreement among samples. Goodman reveals 
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that the correctness of an inductive inference does not depend only 
on the truth of the premise and the validity of the argument, as in 
deduction. In the case of induction, the completeness of the exam-
ples confirming the premise also count. Such completeness depends, 
in its turn, on effective categorization, understood to mean selection 
and application of relevant kinds or projectible predicates that are 
valid for generalization-prediction. What about correctness as related 
to non-verbal world-versions? When is the exemplification provided 
by an abstract painting correct? These questions imply a wider ques-
tion: which are the criteria of fairness of a sample? Goodman exam-
ines various types of samples: samples of fabric, samples of grass 
seeds mixed in a container, samples of drinking water. In all of these 
cases, a sample can be considered fair if it can correctly be projected 
on the features which it exemplifies, that is, if it is obtained and in-
terpreted according to good practices of categorization. Control pro-
cedures then become relevant, such as consistency among samples 
and between different applications-projects of the examples-
samples, which, in their turn, depend on which labels or kinds are 
relevant and right. As in ordinary induction, entranchement (or, the 
record of past projects) of a good practice, the story of habits and 
variations in its style of use, is a preeminent factor. On the other 
hand, what makes a work of art a fair sample? Works of art are not 
examples that come from some roll or container, but samples of an 
ocean: the features of the whole are indeterminate, so the correct-
ness of the drawing, the color, the harmony – the fairness of a work 
as a sample of these features – is confirmed by the good result that 
we obtain in discovering and applying that which is being exemplified. 
In art, the correctness of exemplification coincides with creative abil-
ity: the fairness of the work is in fact tested on its efficacy in building 
a sort of “entranchement-novelty”, discovering new categories or a 
different application of them: “A Mondrian design is right if projecti-
ble to a pattern effective in seeing a world. When Degas painted a 
woman seated near the edge of the picture and looking out of it, he 
defied traditional standards of composition but offered by example a 
new way of seeing, of organizing experience” (Goodman 1978: 137). 
Art, by virtue of its own work, its own ability to demonstrate to the 
maximum extent, the link between comprehension and creation, 
plays an exemplary role for the same philosophical investigation: art 
shows that the knowing – even that of science – is, most of all, an 
“advancement of understanding” (Goodman 1978: 22, but see also 
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Goodman 1988: 161-4), a work of adaptation that stretches the field 
of the aspects that we can discern and identify as such.  
Another element that seems attributable to the ultimate purpose 
of Project Zero – the development of art through improvement in the 
education of artists and the public – is the notion of “implementa-
tion” of the arts, through which Goodman highlights the relational 
aspect of the aesthetic experience, the connection between the aes-
thetic function of a work and the response from an audience. Execu-
tion “consists of making a work, implementation of making it work” 
(Goodman 1984: 143, see also Goodman 1998). The channels 
through which the arts enter into culture – publication, exhibits, and 
performance for an audience – are also means of implementing a 
work. While Goodman also includes the entire process of creating a 
work in “execution” (from its initial concept to the final touch), within 
“implementation”, he includes “all that goes into making a work 
work; and a work works, in my view, to the extent that it is under-
stood, to the extent that what and how it symbolizes […] is discerned 
and affects the way we organize and perceive a world” (Goodman 
1984: 143). Execution and implementation can be distinguished from 
one another even when – as in the performative arts – they occur to-
gether: a work must be executed prior to being implemented, in that 
a work is something made. However, since implementation can make 
something that is not art function as such (for example, a stone col-
lected from the beach and then exposed in a museum), execution 
and implementation make up a continuous process: “On the one 
hand, execution of a work is required for its implementation; on the 
other hand, implementation is the process of bringing about the aes-
thetic functioning that provides the basis for the notion of a work art” 
(Goodman 1984: 145). 
Let us return for a moment to a passage from the quote cited 
above: “a work works […] to the extent that it is understood”. Since 
making a work work means above all improving its comprehension, 
implementation must have not only a communicative valence, but al-
so an educational one. Not by chance, the questioning of the work of 
works reemerges in the reflections that Goodman dedicates to the 
educational mission of museum institutes. The task of museums is to 
make the works that it holds work, inculcating within the visitors the 
ability to see them. In fact, what we see in a museum can influence 
what we see when we leave it. Works work “when by stimulating in-
quisitive looking, sharpening perception […] they participate in the 
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organization and reorganization of experience, and thus in the mak-
ing and remaking of our worlds” (Goodman 1984: 179-80). On the 
other hand, to appreciate the educational mission of museums, we 
must admit that education cannot be reduced to only a verbal pro-
cess; it is not made up only of knowledge, that is of true beliefs, but 
of a wider “advancement of understanding”. Thus, understanding a 
painting “involves discerning its special stylistic and other visual 
properties – learning how to see it and see in terms of it” (Goodman 
1984: 173). Its educational value beyond knowledge of the artistic 
symbols depends also on the manner in which it makes our sight 
more acute. Among the symptoms of the aesthetic is the relative re-
pleteness, for which many aspects of a symbol are significant: for ex-
ample, if we compare the profile of a mountain in a drawing by Hoku-
sai with the profile of a stock market graph, we can realize that in the 
first, each form, line, thickness, etc. has an importance, while in the 
second one, the only thing that counts is the distance of the line from 
the base. This characteristic, along with the other symptoms of the 
aesthetic, tends to draw the attention to the symbol instead of mak-
ing it only the means through which we can reach what we are refer-
ring to. The nontransparency of a work of art trains us to rest on what 
we observe, to widen our vision without neglecting a single detail, in 
order to see aspects and structures that we would not have been 
able to otherwise. Education for the arts does not only allow us to 
produce, understand, and make works work, but also to improve the 
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